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THE BUSINESS RESPONSE TO THE 
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
Introduction 
An economist once remarked, in exasperation: "Economic forecasting is not an 
art or science; it is a hazard." This feeling is underscored by the briefest 
reconnaissance of recent experience. At the end of the 1980s, who expected the Soviet 
Union to walk away from the communist party monopoly? And that Gorbachev would 
be booed at the Moscow May Day parade? Or that Lithuania would have the chance to 
vote for independence? Or that Poland would move toward the private enterprise 
system? Or that Russian troops would leave Hungary? Or that the Berlin Wall would 
comedown? 
No, I did not forecast any of those good things. Nobody' s crystal ball was that 
good, and that is the point: any one economist can try to analyze what he or she thinks 
will happen. But each organization must do its own contingency planning, always 
asking, "What if things turn out differently?" 
It is clear that overseas developments are looming ever larger in business 
decision making. Let us examine the international economy and the changing 
responses of the individual company. 
The Global Marketplace1 
The global marketplace surely has arrived when villagers in the Middle East 
follow the Gulf War on CNN, via Soviet government satellite and through a private 
subsidiary of a local government enterprise. Both public and private businesses 
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are involved, and they are located in three different continents. 
Here are several more quantitative indicators of the global marketplace. Over 
one-half of the products manufactured in the United States have one or more foreign 
components. This development was nicely summed up in a recent cartoon. The 
customer asks the auto dealer, "Is this car made in the U.S.?" The salesman responds 
with another question, "Which part?" 
A second way of looking at the global marketplace is to consider that one-half 
of all imports and exports - what governments label foreign trade - is transacted 
between domestic companies and their foreign affiliates or foreign parents. That is true 
in the United States, the European Community (EC), and Japan. From the viewpoint 
of political geography, the activity is classified as foreign commerce. But from an 
economic viewpoint, these international flows of goods and services are internal 
transfers within the same company. 
One final indicator: despite the massive and well-known U.S. trade deficit, 
U.S. companies sell to and in other nations as much as, if not more than, "foreign" 
companies sell in and to the United States.2 This leads to a related set of questions. Is 
Honda USA part of the American economy? What about mM in Tokyo? The 
consequences of the internationalization of business are profound for many U.S. firms. 
Half of Xerox's 110,000 employees work on foreign soil. More than half of Digital 
Equipment's revenues come from overseas operations. One-third of GE's profits arise 
from its international activities. 3 
Technology and economics are outpacing our traditional way of thinking about 
international politics. The standard geopolitical map is out of sync with the emerging 
business and economic map. Economic and technological forces are powerful agents 
for change. 
A dramatic example is the Kuwaiti bank that was moved by FAX machine. The 
day of the Iraqi invasion, the manager set up three open telephone lines with his office 
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in Bahrain. Over two he transmitted all of the bank's key documents via FAX. Over 
the third, he checked to make sure that each page was being received. From time to 
time, the shooting around him slowed the process, but before the end of the day, the 
necessary transmissions were complete. The next morning the bank opened up as a 
Bahraini institution neither subject to the freeze on Kuwaiti assets nor to Iraqi control. 4 
On a more aggregate level, fundamental shifts are occurring in national 
positions in the international economy. There will be three regions of dominant 
economic power as far into the twenty-first century as we can see. One is North 
America, led by the United States. Another is Japan and the other Asian rim countries 
that are doing so well. The third is the reinvigorated EC where change is taking place 
on an unprecedented scale. 
The USSR is conspicuously absent from my list of dominant economic powers. 
The Soviet Union is still very much a military superpower. But its economy- aside 
from the military sector- remains relatively primitive. According to the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences, USSR computer capacity is less than one one-thousandth of that 
of the United States. 5 
From every available indication, Japan's economic strength will stay at a very 
high level and continue to increase. The magic formula for economic success in Japan 
(or Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) is quite simple: go to school longer 
and study harder; work harder and produce more; consume less and save more. And 
repeat the process into the next generation. 
This is a formula that other nations could follow without getting sued for patent · 
infringement. Alas, even if this success formula could be patented, few Americans 
would likely ever be sued for infringement. Some of the participants in this conference 
may remember reading last fall about the Michigan factories that had to close down 
because deer hunting season was starting. Very few people bothered reporting to work. 
How many Asian factories close down for hunting or fishing? 
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EC '92 
Let us focus most of our attention on Europe this morning. This seems to be 
the area of the globe where the most radical economic changes will be taking place in 
the 1990s. 
The key structural change in Western Europe is the economic integration of the 
twelve members of the European Community, scheduled to be completed by the end of 
1992. This phenomenon usually is referred to as EC '92 even though the actions being 
taken constitute an ongoing process that is likely to continue into 1993 and beyond. 
The big positive about EC '92 is that the twelve countries are reducing 
restrictions on business, trade, and labor. People as well as goods and investments will 
be able to move readily from one of the common market nations to any other. That 
will make them more efficient as they achieve greater economies of scale and as 
standardization replaces twelve varieties of many products and services. 
However, the big negative - from the viewpoint of other nations - is that the 
trade wall around the EC is not coming down. Actually, the EC is toughening its 
external barriers to commerce. Enlightened economists are not supposed to use 
pejorative terms such as Fortress Europa, so let us cite some numbers instead. In 
1960, more than 60 percent of the foreign trade of the EC members was outside of the 
EC. Now over 60 percent of their trade stays in the EC, a complete reversal.6 That 
ratio is bound to rise further because of EC '92. 
The Europeans tell American companies not to worry, that their trade 
restrictions, such as reciprocity and domestic content rules, are aimed at Japan. 
However, we do not know how good their aim is. The same restrictions that hit Japan 
can keep out U.S. goods. Moreover, if the Asian rim countries are kept out of Europe, 
the Western Hemisphere is their major alternate market. 
EC '92 will produce winners and losers, on both sides of the Atlantic. Likely 
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winners will include strong U.S. firms with an established presence in Western Europe. 
High-tech, well-capitalized American companies are accustomed to competing on a 
continent-wide basis. They can use one EC country as a base to sell to the other 
eleven. General Motors and Ford have more Europe-wide strength than such European 
automakers as Volkswagen, Fiat, Peugeot, and Renault. The same holds true for 
computer manufacturers such as mM, Digital Equipment, Unisys, and Hewlett Packard 
compared to their European counterparts. 
One loser from EC '92 will be the high-cost European companies who have 
been sheltered within their national markets. Many of them will be hurt by continent-
wide competition. Not all barriers will be down. The French are not going to make a 
stampede for German wine, for instance. In contrast, the winners will include the 
stronger European companies who will be enjoying the economies of scale and growing 
domestic markets. 
Finally, many U.S. firms are likely to be losers from the European economic 
unification. They will find it more difficult to export to Europe. They also will face 
rougher competition in their domestic markets from the stronger EC businesses. The 
losers will include many companies who have not yet awakened to developments across 
the Atlantic. One recent survey found that less than one-half of all American 
corporations had even heard about Europe 1992. Only a small fraction of U.S. firms 
are responding to that strategic change. 6 
Moreover, the EC is not a static concept. It started with six countries -
Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Gradually, it 
has expanded to twelve- adding the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, 
Spain, and Portugal. That will not be the end of the line. Many other European 
nations are seeking admission. Aside from the special case of East Germany, which 
has now been unified with West Germany, they have been told to wait until1993 or 
later. 
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Austria is a logical candidate for early entry into the EC. Although its economy 
is modest in size, its admission could be a strategic move, especially since Vienna often 
views itself as a gateway to Eastern Europe. Most likely, Hungary would then be close 
behind in the waiting line in Brussels. Czechoslovakia and Poland might be next or, at 
the least, they could apply to become "associate members." 
Other prime candidates for EC membership are the Scandinavian countries, 
Iceland, Sweden, Finland, and especially Norway, since Denmark is already in. In any 
event, the trade barriers between the EC and the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) will be disappearing soon. (EFTA includes Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Iceland, Austria, and Switzerland.) The EC and EFTA are joining forces to form a 
trade-barrier-free "European Economic Space." 
Now consider the impact of the EC going from 12 members to 16 or 20. 
Adding all those GNPs together shows that, in the 1990s, Western (and Central) 
Europe will become the world's largest market area. Japan and the United States will 
be on the outside looking in. But Eastern Europe really is a wild card. 
Business Potentials in Eastern Europe 
Four decades of communist rule have left the economies of Eastern Europe in 
very poor shape. They are experiencing great difficulty converting their inefficient 
nationalized industries to competitive private enterprises. Because of the Marxian 
cliche that unemployment does not exist under communism, East European enterprises 
are notoriously overstaffed. One steel mill in Poland employs 30,000 workers to make 
the same amount of steel for which an American company uses 7, 000 people. 8 
Eastern Europe lacks a business infrastructure, which is something so basic to 
the efficient functioning of a modem economy that western nations take it for granted. 
These basic requisites for a private enterprise system include: (1) a body of 
commercial law which is enforced, (2) a credible accumulation of cost accounting data 
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which can be used both for setting prices and making valuations of assets, (3) personnel 
who can perform fmancial analyses, (4) banks to provide credit on the basis of financial 
valuations rather than political determinations, and (5) organizations to provide 
insurance of normal business risks. 
Incredibly, Eastern Europe is a world with a shortage of lawyers, accountants, 
and insurance agents! From a positive viewpoint, that large area may provide a major 
new client base for many service enterprises in the more advanced economies. 
Eastern Europe also needs generous supplies of capital from the United States 
and other capitalist nations. This is brought home by Lech Walesa's response to the 
numerous (and perhaps patronizing) statements by Americans that, in view of the many 
Poles- such as General Pulaski and General Koskiosko- who helped the United 
States during its critical formative period, it is only proper for Americans to repay that 
moral debt. Walesa on occasion has answered, "OK, so now send us General Electric, 
General Motors, and General Mills." 
Attracting foreign capital in substantial amounts will not be easy. The Eastern 
Europeans were brought up to hate greedy capitalists and profiteering. But the move to 
capitalism (which they all seem to want) will be difficult without capital and capitalists. 
It also will be necessary for the rank-and-file employees of the Eastern 
European nations to do a 180-degree turn in their attitude toward work. They must 
abandon their universal slogan, "They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work. " 
Consider the thousands of former East Germans who have been fired by their new 
employers because they were not in the habit of returning to work after lunch. 
Not all Eastern European nations are likely to make the transition to democratic 
capitalism. Of course, it would be most heartening if several do demonstrate that a 
nation can return from communism to capitalism - a move which has yet to be 
accomplished anywhere. 
Those countries that succeed could be tough competitors for our low-tech, high-
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labor-cost industries. On the other hand, they could also become subcontractors and 
suppliers to U.S. and Western European flrms hard pressed by Asian competitors. The 
high school education of East European workers is quite good as measured by 
standardized math and science tests. 
Threat and Opportunity for Business 
Within the capitalistic nations, the tension between domestic political forces and 
international economic influences is rising. While private enterprise is increasingly 
global, government policy remains parochial. Voters still care about jobs in their 
country, state, and locality and politicians react to those sentiments. Yet there is a 
third force. Consumers vote every day of the week- in dollars, yen, deutschemarks, 
pounds, francs, and lira. The same voters, as consumers, buy products made anywhere 
in the world. They think more about price and quality than country of origin. And 
they increasingly travel to, and communicate with, people in virtually every land. 
Without thinking about it, consumers are adapting to the global economy. After 
all, if consumers were not so globally oriented, the pressures for restricting trade would 
not arise in the flrst place. In the years ahead, the power of economic forces and 
technological change will increasingly force voters and government officials to adjust to 
the realities of the international economy. 9 
For business, these developments offer both threat and opportunity. The 
opportunity arises as more of the developing countries enter the status of industrialized 
nations. Advanced economies are the best customers of other advanced economies. 
But at the same time home markets will become increasingly vulnerable to foreign 
competition. 
There is great similarity between the domestic threat of hostile takeovers and the 
loss of market position due to new foreign competition. In both cases, the flrm is 
forced to review its strengths and weaknesses and to rethink its long-term strategy. 
9 
Streamlining, accelerated product development, and organizational restructuring often 
are responses to both sets of factors. 
United Technology exemplifies the reliance on geographic diversification in 
developing new products. For its Elevonic 411, its French division worked on the door 
systems; the Spanish division handled the small-geared components; the German · 
subsidiary was responsible for the electronics; the Japanese unit designed the special 
motor drives; and the Connecticut group handled the systems integration. International 
teamwork cut the development cycle in half. 10 
When we step back and assume a longer-term perspective, we can see 
fundamental changes occurring in the nature of business. Joint ventures are no longer 
an obscure legal form. Strategic alliances are no longer just a theoretical possibility; 
they increasingly involve companies located on different continents. Often the same 
companies engage in joint ventures to develop new products, co-produce existing 
products, serve as sources of supply for each other, share output, and compete. 
The automobile industry provides a fascinating array of examples. General 
Motors has joint ventures with Japan's Toyota and Suzuki and partial ownership of 
Sweden's Saab, Korea's Daewoo, and Japan's Isuzu and Suzuki. Volkswagen reports 
joint ventures with America's Ford and Japan's Nissan and Toyota, and has a stake in 
Czechoslovakia's Skoda. 11 Virtually all of these companies compete with their 
partners and investors, at least to some degree. 
There are some lessons that can be learned from the experience of companies 
that do well in international markets. 12 First of all, they change their basic corporate 
goals to conform to a global marketplace; for the most successful, top management 
leads that process of adjustment. Secondly, they translate a domestic advantage to 
create overseas opportunities by adapting their established home products to the local 
markets in other nations. Pall Filters, the major U.S. producers of wine filters, 
cracked the snobbish French market by designing a new French version of their filters. 
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They then went on to penetrate the Italian wine market with a third variation of their 
product. 
Third, the successful global firms do not set up large international 
bureaucracies. One recent survey reported that the cost of the international staff rarely 
exceeds 1 percent of sales. Moreover, most overseas operations are run by foreign 
nationals who understand the local markets. Further, they start their foreign operations 
when the company is still of moderate size, contradicting the widespread notion that 
only giant companies can succeed overseas. Moreover, a global economy does not 
mean that every company should try to cater to global markets. Some firms are 
learning the hard way to focus on specialty products and market niches where they have 
special advantages. 
Finally, global successes encourage foreign subsidiaries to make innovations 
which can also be used in the home market. Dunkin Donuts established its reputation 
in the United States by always having fresh donuts and coffee prepared on the 
premises. In Tokyo, however, land was too expensive so the company started 
preparing the donuts and coffee on the trucks bringing in supplies. The company is 
now starting to follow this practice in some of its domestic locations. 
All this illustrates an earlier point: in change, there is both threat and 
opportunity - and the global marketplace surely is changing rapidly. 
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